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NEW YORK'S DO-NOT-RESUSCITATE LAW:
GROUNDBREAKING PROTECTION OF PATIENT
AUTONOMY OR A PHYSICIAN'S RIGHT TO MAKE
MEDICAL FUTILITY DETERMINATIONS?
Edward F. McArdle*

SUMMARY
New York's Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) law was groundbreaking when
it was first enacted in 1987. Now, it is on the forefront of the medical
futility debate, whose proponents seek to supplant patient autonomy
with the medical ethical principles of beneficence and non-maleficence
as the primary basis for medical decision making. Beneficence is a
duty to promote the patient's interest, and non-maleficence (more
commonly known by the adage "Do No Harm") is a duty to avoid harm
to the patient.' Both are ethical principles derived from philosophical
theory that guide health care providers to the clinical practice of
medicine. 2 Since ancient times, they have been at the core of medical
decision making. 3 In the past half century, however, they have been

. Edward F. McArdle is an assistant attorney general on the staff of the New
York
Attorney General. He also serves as an adjunct lecturer at Upstate Medical University and an
extern supervisor for the Syracuse University College of Law. He is admitted to the practice of
law in New York and is a graduate of Albany Law School of Union University. This article
expresses the author's views alone and is not intended to reflect the position of the New York
Attorney General.
1 See, e.g., BERNARD Lo, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS: A GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS 3137 (Lipincott Press, 2nd Ed. 2000); RONALD MUNSON, INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION: BASIC
ISSUES 2IN MEDICAL ETHICS 31-32 (Wadsworth/Thompson Learning, 6th Ed. 2000).
id.
3 See, e.g., Larry R. Churchill, Beneficence, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 243, 45-46
(Warren Thomas Reich ed., rev. ed. 1995) (citing duty of beneficence which has been "central
to the health professions" since the Hippocratic Oath); Appendix, "Oath of Hippocrates, Fourth
Century, B.C.") Id. at 2632 (prescribes that physicians take beneficent action ("for the benefit
of the sick") and refrain from maleficent action ("keep them from harm and injustice").
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joined by the principle of patient autonomy to form the modem day
cornerstone of the physician-patient relationship.4
Like DNR legislation enacted in other states, New York's DNR
law sought to promote patient autonomy by providing a means for
patients and families to make decisions to refuse cardiopulmonary

resuscitation (CPR). However, it also empowered family members to
consent to DNR orders when the patient's wishes about medical
treatment were not known. As such, it served as a precursor to the
current debate in New York and other states over surrogate decision

making laws, which propose authorizing family members or other
surrogates to make medical decisions in the absence of knowledge of
the patient's wishes. This includes the power to consent to the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.
New York's DNR law was also more ambitious than conventional
DNR laws because its theoretical framework incorporated other
medical ethical principles in addition to patient autonomy, which in the
last century has become the standard bearer for virtually all state laws
and court decisions related to ending life-sustaining treatment. Going
beyond laws in other states, New York's DNR law provided physicians
with authority, based on medical futility, to make DNR orders for
patients who lacked both decision making ability and a family member
or proxy to make health care decisions.
In the context of the debate over withholding or withdrawing lifesustaining treatment for patients whose actual or likely wishes are not
known, measuring the use of life-sustaining medical treatments on the
yardstick
of physician-determined
medical
futility
remains
controversial and hotly debated. New York's DNR law, however,
which provides the same powers within the confines of CPR, has
remained largely unquestioned. This may be because the law is limited
to one type of life-sustaining treatment. Another reason may be that it
is limited to patients who are terminally ill or permanently unconscious,
which falls within societal normative values on when it is appropriate
to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment.
Currently, the New York State agency charged with overseeing
New York's DNR law, the New York State Department of Health
4 See, e.g.,

Lo, supra note 1, at 3-41; THOMAS BEAUCHAMP, JAMES CHILDRESS,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 12-13, 57-282 (5th ed., 2001). (The first edition published in
1979 is widely credited with founding the present-day bioethical approach to medical decision
making and also advocated the wider principle of distributive justice in the provision of health
care.)
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(DOH), has thrown its weight behind an even broader application of
medical futility that supports a physician's right to issue a DNR order
based on medical futility over the objection of a patient or family
member. Based on the work of the influential New York State Task
Force oi Life and the Law (Task Force), DOH and other important
health care players in New York, this information can be found on the
DOH official website. It has also been widely disseminated to New
York physicians. Many, if not most, New York physicians believe that
New York's DNR law supports a physician's determination to withhold
CPR based on medical futility over the objection of the patient or a
proxy decision maker.
The purpose of this article is to determine whether New York's
DNR law supports the DOH's determination that a physician can
override patient objection and issue a DNR order based on medical
futility. The historical background and context for New York's DNR
law and DNR legislation in general is examined, as well as the ethical
conflict that results when patient autonomy clashes with the medical
ethical principles of beneficence and non-maleficence.
These
principles are implicated when a physician seeks to override a patient
or patient family refusal to consent to a DNR order.
The interpretation advanced by New York's DOH is
unprecedented because it proposes balancing medical futility over
patient autonomy. By doing so, a state agency, for what appears to be
the first time, has recognized that autonomy can be overridden by
ethical principles of beneficence and non-maleficence. Since at least

the writing of the Hippocratic Oath, these principles have provided the
underpinnings to the physician-patient relationship, which preceded the
emergence of patient autonomy in the last century.
This article will argue that the New York state agency's
interpretation is consistent with both the spirit and the intent of the
DNR law, as well as with evolving ethical views on resolution of
conflicts arising between patient autonomy and other medical ethical
principles. It seeks to harmonize the DNR law's emphasis on patient
self-determination against other, equally important medical ethical
principles of beneficence and non-maleficence.
It also contains
necessary checks to insure that decisions to withhold CPR based on
medical futility, as well as decisions by patients or family members to
refuse to consent to a DNR order, comport with prevailing societal
values on the use of life-sustaining treatments. The law must first be
understood against the backdrop of ethical, medical and legal
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principles, which support physician medical futility detenninations to

issue a DNR order when CPR will not sustain the patient's life. The
statute's narrowly drawn definition of medical futility, and its
requirement that proxy decisions not based on patient autonomy can

only be made when the patient is terminally ill or permanently
unconscious, supports the DOHI's view and places it well within the
mainstream of medical ethical thought.
The debate over New York's DNR law may herald a new
recognition of the linits of health care decision making based on the
principle of autonomy alone and revitalize other medical ethical
principles, beneficence and non-maleficence, that historically have
been important to the physician-patient relationship. The approach
taken by New York could provide guidance to other states when they
face the same unavoidable conflict between patient autonomy and
health care providers relying on other medical ethical principles.
BACKGROUND
When enacted in 1987, New York's Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) Law
was a leading edge legislative initiative which sought to provide
patients with a clear means of declining cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation. 5 Cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is the treatment
for cardiac arrest. 6 It refers to the various types of procedures available
to physicians to "restore cardiac function or to support ventilation in the
event of a cardiac or respiratory arrest." 7 It is one of many lifesaving
5 N.Y. PUB3. IHAtiiH LAW, Art. 29-B, §§ 2960-2979 (McKinney 1988); See, e.g., § 2960,
Legislative findings and purposes ("The legislature finds that, although cardiopulmonary
resuscitation has proved invaluable in the prevention of sudden, unexpected death, it is
appropriate for an attending physician, in certain circumstances, to issue an order not to attempt
cardiopulmonary resuscitation of a patient where appropriate consent has been obtained. The
legislature further finds that there is a need to clarify and establish the rights and obligations of
patients, their families, and health care providers regarding cardiopulmonary resuscitation and
the issuance of orders not to resuscitate."); See, e.g., George P. Smith 11, Euphemistic Codes
and Tell-Tale Hears. Humane Issistance hI End-Of-Life Cases, 10 HEALTH! MATRIX 175, 191
(2000) (As of 1994, New York one of only two states that had "enacted statutes that furnish
foirmal procedures governing decisions not to resuscitate"); Elizabeth Shaver, Do Not
Resuscitate. The Failure to Protect the Icompeteit Patient's Right of Self-Determinatioi, 75
COR<NH-, L. REv. 218, 239 - 243 (1989) (in criticizing the law, finds the law unique because it
departs from substituted judgment standard for decision making for incompetent patients who
have no surrogate).
Paul C. Sorum, Limiting Cardiopumoiariy Resuscitation, 57 ALP. L. Riv. 617, 617618 (1994) (provides detailed explanation of CPR).
7 N.Y. Pur. -lEIi
LAW § 2961, subd. 4 (McKinney 1988).
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techniques which became widely available in the second half of the
20th Century. 8 Examples of CPR include mouth-to-mouth rescue

breathing, direct cardiac injection, intravenous medications, electrical
defibrillation and open chest cardiac massage. 9 In order for it to be
10
effective, CPR must be started within minutes of the arrest.
However, as with other lifesaving techniques, the benefits of CPR
may be limited for some patients, such as those who are chronically
rather than acutely ill."
The effectiveness of CPR can be limited
because of the patient's other medical conditions.12 Further, it can be

painful, with greater risk of pain for frail, elderly patients.1 3 CPR may
not be able to Irevent irreversible damage to body organs, including
brain damage.
Many seriously ill patients informed of the risks may

wish to avoid CPR. 15 Further, many doctors consider it to be medically

8 "Life-prolonging treatment" has been defined by the British Medical Association
(BMA) as "all treatment which has the potential to postpone the patient's death and includes
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, artificial ventilation, specialized treatments for particular
conditions such as chemotherapy or dialysis, antibiotics when given for a potentially lifethreatening infection and artificial nutrition and hydration."
BMA, Withholding and
Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment -- Guidancefor Decision Making, Part 1, §
3.2.
9 See NYS Health Dept. Regs, 10 N.Y.C.R.R. § 405.43 (b)(4) (1988); Do NOT
RESUSCITATE ORDERS: THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE
TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW 3 (New York: New York State Task Force on Life and Law,
2nd ed. 1988) ("Basic resuscitation involves the initiation and maintenance of respiration and
heartbeat through simple techniques such as mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and external chest
compression which can be administered without equipment by any person trained in CPR.
Advanced resuscitation requires more sophisticated techniques and is performed by trained
medical personnel.").
10See New York Task Force on Li.fe'and the Law, supra note 9, at 3 ("In order for CPR
to be effective, basic techniques must be initiated within minutes of the arrest (ordinarily within
4-5 minutes), and must be followed immediately by advanced life support (within 10-12
minutes of the arrest.").
11See, e.g., Sorum, supra note 6, at 617-618.
12See New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, supra note 9, at 4.
13id..
14See, e.g., In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134-136 (1978) ("many of these procedure are
... highly intrusive, and some are violent in nature. The defibrillator, for example, causes
violent (and painful) muscle contractions which, in a patient suffering (as this patient is) from
osteoporosis, may cause fracture of vertebrae or other bones. Such fractures, in turn, cause
pain, which may be extreme."). See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5, at 176 ("Because many
resuscitated patients were critically ill, extremely ill, extremely elderly, or severely and
irreversible demented, resuscitation oftentimes served only to prolong suffering or to sustain
patients in a persistent vegetative state.").
15 See, e.g., Sorum supra note 6, at 628-635; Smith supra note 5, at 176 ("[P]hysicians,
patients and patients' families became increasingly concerned that resuscitation was not always
in the best interests of the patient.").
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futile for some patients and not always in the patient's best interests to
attempt resuscitation. 6
DNR legislation in New York and other states was enacted against
a backdrop of expanding use of CPR for all patients, even for patients
that physicians believed would experience little or no benefit from the
procedures, and against court decisions in the 1970s and 1980s in
which a right of competent patients to decline life-sustaining treatment
became firmly established."7
The use of CPR was originally limited to patients suffering acute
heart or respiratory arrest.1 8 However, it was soon expanded to all
19
patients, including those suffering from underlying terminal illnesses.
Its required use on all patients who suffer a heart arrest was

institutionalized

by hospitals

and regulating

authorities

as

an

emergency procedure unless
an order to the contrary, a DNR order, was
20
physician.
a
by
written
Many physicians have objected to the required use of CPR where
it will likely fail as "a cruel and fruitless assault on severely ill and
demented patients." 21 In one documented case, CPR was administered
fifty-two times over a six week period before the patient's death.22
Because it was believed that many patients, if given a choice, would
refuse CPR, DNR legislation was enacted in order to provide patients

16 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5. See also Thomas Finucane, Symposium Article,
Thinking About Life-Sustaining Treatment Late In the Life Of A Demented Person, 35 GA. L.
REV. 691 (2001).
17See, e.g., ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT To DIE 37 (Wiley Law Publications, 1995).
'8See, e.g., Sorum, supra note 6, at 618 ("But quickly it was used, even by its inventors,
on patients without ventricular fibrillation as well, that is, on types of patients for whom it was
not originally intended.").
'9See, e.g.,
Smith, supra note 5, at 178 ("[CPR] is a desperate invasive procedure that
was not intended to delay the impending death of patients who are suffering from terminal
illnesses.").
20 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5 at 178 ("This classification [of CPR as an emergency
procedure] led to the expanded use of CPR, well beyond the select group of patients for which
it was intended, and therefore a pervasive, indiscriminate, and often contraindicated use of CPR
by health-care workers.").
21 See, e.g., Sorum, supra note 6 at 618. See also M. SCOTT PECK, DENIAL OF THE SOULSPIRITUAL AND MEDICAL PERSPECTIVES ON EUTHANASIA AND MORTALITY 10-12 (Harmony
Books, 1997) (author recounts experience as a psychiatric resident involved in the care of a
permanently unconscious patient who had been placed on life support and was being
maximally, treated over author's objection, author intentionally twisted IV that was providing
medication that was maintaining patient's blood pressure).
22See New York Task Force on Life and the Law, supra note 9, at 8.
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with an advance means to reject CPR.2 3 It was also hoped that patient
choice would end the use of "slow" or "show" codes24 by some
physicians, who would make delayed or half-hearted attempts to revive
patients 5for whom they believed CPR would provide little or no
2
benefit.
NEW YORK'S DO-NOT-RESUSCITATE LAW

In New York, the need for DNR legislation was especially compelling
because of a decision by its highest court in 1981, in Matter of Storar
and Matter of Eichner, that hinged termination of lifesaving treatment

on knowledge of the actual intent of the patient. 26 Expanding on earlier
cases in other states that based decisions to terminate life-sustaining
treatment on patient autonomy, New York's Court of Appeals held that
life-sustaining treatment could not be terminated for a patient who had
never been competent to express an intention. 27 In Eichner, the Court
authorized removal of a respirator from a Catholic cleric, who had
suffered a stroke which rendered him permanently comatose, because
he had made his wishes known about life-sustaining treatment when he
28
was competent.
In the companion Storar case, however, the Court
held that lifesaving blood transfusions required by a developmentally

disabled, never-competent man suffering from cancer could not be
23 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2960 (McKinney 1988) ("it is appropriate for an

attending physician, in certain circumstances, to issue an order not to attempt cardiopulmonary
resuscitation of a patient where appropriate consent has been obtained.").
24A "slow code" is a delayed response to a patient's cardiac or respiratory arrest that the
health care provider knows is likely to be ineffective in reviving the patient. The goal is to
"shield [physicians] from litigation that could arise from an outward or written order calling for
the inaction of hospital personnel." See Smith, supra note 5, at 180. A "show code" is
sometimes also referred to as a "short code" and refers to a prompt but less than maximal
response by a health care provider to a patient's arrest "taken largely as a symbolic gesture
designed to reassure or placate the family of a patient- or the health care personnel, themselvesthat 'everything was done."' See Smith, supra note 5, at 184.
25 See, e.g., Smith supra note 5, at 180-184; Do NOT RESUSCITATE ORDERS: THE

PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND REPORT OF HE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE

LAW 6-7 (New York: New York State Task Force on Life and Law, 2nd ed. 1988).
26 See, e.g., Matter of Storar and Matter of Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64 (1981),
cert. denied,
454 US 858 (1981).
27Matter of Storar and Eichner, supra note 26. (In the Storar case, in which application
was made by parent to discontinue blood transfusion for a never-competent, terminally ill
patient, Court rejected use of substituted judgment standard (i.e. determination of probable
wishes by a surrogate), finding that "it would be unrealistic to attempt to determine whether he
would want to continue potentially life prolonging treatment if he were competent.").
28

-
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ended, even with the consent and at the behest of the patient's parent,
because there was and could be no competent evidence of the patient's
29
wishes about his health care treatment.
The purpose of New York's DNR law was not limited to giving a
voice to patients who had made their wishes clear about resuscitation
while competent. The law also spells out a list of surrogates to make
decisions for incompetent patients and empowers these surrogates to
make decisions based on the best interests of the patient if the patient's
actual wishes are not known and cannot be ascertained. 30 The
surrogate list is so comprehensive that any patient with a spouse, child
over eighteen, parent, sibling over eighteen or even a "close friend" has
someone who could act for the patient.3 1 A precondition to the
surrogate's authority to consent to a DNR order is a determination by
the attending physician and a second physician that the patient suffers
from a qualifying medical condition, either that the patient suffered
from a terminal condition or was permanently unconsciousness, that
resuscitation would be medically futile, or that
"resuscitation would
32
impose an extraordinary burden on the patient."
New York's DNR law represents one of the first state laws to
authorize the withholding of a life-sustaining treatment for patients who
had not made an intention known.33 Likewise, it may have been the
first law to acknowledge that the withholding of a life-sustaining
treatment could be in the best interests of the patient. 34 By authorizing
decisions to withhold CPR when patient autonomy is absent, it gave
life to longstanding, but neglected, medical ethical principles of
beneficence and non-maleficence, which along with patient autonomy,

29 Id.

30See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2965 subd. 2(a) (McKinney 1988) (sets forth a

surrogate list to be chosen in order of priority, beginning with a guardian, spouse, child over
eighteen, parent, sibling over 18, and ending with a close friend); See also § 2965 subd. 3
(requires that surrogates make decisions based on the "the adult patient's wishes, including a
consideration of the patient's religious and moral beliefs, or, if the patient's wishes are unknown
and cannot be ascertained, on the basis of the patient's best interests.) (Note that subd. 3

requires that before a DNR can be issued that the attending physician with the concurrence of
another physician determine that the patient have a terminal condition, be permanently
unconscious, that resuscitation be medically futile or that resuscitation would place "an
extraordinary burden" on the patient).

31See § 2965 subd. 2.
32 See, e.g., § 2965 subd.
3(c).

33See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5.
34 See, e.g., § 2965 subd. 3 (a).
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35
form the key ethical principles guiding medical decision making.
Equally important, New York's DNR law, by primarily limiting its
application to patients who were terminally ill or permanently
unconscious, comports with prevailing societal normative values 36
on
when it is ethically appropriate to terminate life-sustaining treatment.

Even more far reaching, New York's DNR law authorizes
unilateral physician determinations to issue a DNR order based on
medical futility when the patient is incompetent and has no known
surrogates to make decisions. 37 This was groundbreaking because it

went beyond the autonomy base recognized in court cases and
legislation in other states.
It was heralded because it allowed
physicians to withhold CPR, a life-sustaining procedure, based on
medical futility grounds. 38 It was also criticized as failing to protect the
rights of incompetent patients from decisions made by physicians to
of the patient. 39

issue a DNR order which would lead to the death

Given the reach of the law, it has generated surprisingly little
litigation. 40

35 See, e.g., Lo, supra note 1, at 30 et seq. (Lippincott Press, 2nd ed. 2000) (this chapter
which provides guidance for physicians in how to balance patient autonomy, beneficence, and
doing no harm, author "discusses how physicians can protect the well-being of patient, while
avoiding the pitfalls of paternalism." When patients "reject the recommendations of their
physicians ... physicians are torn between respecting autonomy and acting in the patient's best
interests. If physicians simply accept unwise patient decisions in the name of respecting patient
autonomy, their role seems morally constricted.").
36See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2965 subd. 3(c) (McKinney 1988).
37 § 2966 ("If no surrogate is reasonably available ... regarding issuance of an order not
to resuscitate on behalf of an adult patient who lacks capacity and who has not previously
expressed a decision regarding cardiopulmonary resuscitation, an attending physician may
issue an order not to resuscitate the patient, provided that the attending physician determines in
writing that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, resuscitation would be medically
futile, and another physician concurs in writing with such determination.
38 See, e.g., Daniel Robert Mordarski, Medical Futility Has Ending Life Support
Become the Next "Pro-Choice/Right to Life" Debate?, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 751, 784-786
(1993) (relies on New York's DNR statute as basis for proposed legislation that would
authorize physicians to make decisions to withhold CPR or other life-sustaining treatment
based on medical futility grounds if, after a dispute mediation process, it was determined that
the surrogate's refusal to consent to a DNR order or to the withdrawal or withholding of other
life-sustaining treatment constituted one of the "few extreme and outrageous situations in which
the surrogate was clearly not making a decision in the best interest of the patient."). id.
39 See Shaver, supra note 5.
40See MEISEL, supra note 17, § 9.4 at 544.
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Although New York's DNR legislation reached beyond patient

self-determination, it is firmly rooted in autonomy. 4 1 Consent is
necessary from the patient or surrogate before issuance of a DNR
order.4 2 Indeed, because CPR is considered an emergency procedure,
New York's law presumes consent to its administration.43 It is only
when the patient does not make an intention known and there is no
surrogate who can exercise the patient's autonomy that the DNR law
permits physicians to unilaterally issue a DNR order for patients who
are terminally ill, permanently
unconscious or for whom resuscitation
44
would be medically futile.
The law also provides for a mediation system for disputes about
the use of CPR.4 5 Each hospital is required to establish a mediation
system. 46 Unless patient capacity is at issue, the law imposes few
requirements on the process employed other than that it be documented
in writing, and even authorizes the hospital to make use of existing
resources, such as a patient advocate or chaplain's office. 4 7 A hospital
ethics committee would be well suited to hear such disputes.
"Any dispute" about CPR can be heard under the system and

submission of a dispute stays the entry of a DNR order for up to 72
hours. 48 However, although the law planned for disputes between
physicians and patients or their proxies over the use of CPR, it
contemplated that these disputes would be based on patient refusal of
41See, e.g., N.Y. Puo. HEALTH LAW § 2960 (McKinney 1988) ("legislature finds" that "is
appropriate for an attending physician, in certain circumstances, to issue an order not to attempt
cardiopulmonary resuscitation of a patient where an appropriate consent has been obtained).
42 See § 2964 subd. 1(a); § 2965 subd. 3 (The consent of an adult with capacity
must be
obtained prior to issuing an order not to resuscitate, except as provided in [§2964 subd 3]);
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2965 subd. 3 requires that the physician obtain the consent of a
health care agent or, if none, then from the surrogate list set forth in N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2965 subd. 2(a)).
43 See, e.g., § 2962 subd. 1. ("Every person admitted to a hospital shall be presumed to
consent to the administration of cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the event of cardiac or
respiratory distress, unless there is consent to the issuance of an order not to resuscitate as
provided in this article."); See Sorum, supra note 6, at 633 ("CPR is, like other emergency lifesaving treatments, a procedure to which the patient is automatically presumed to consent in the
absence of an explicit prior decision to withhold it. This principle, which in New York State is
given legal force in the 1988 DNR legislation, follows from the preciousness of life, the
incapacity of the unconscious patient who has suffered the arrest, and the need to start CPR
immediately if it is to have any chance of success.").
44 See, e.g., § 2965 subd. 3(c).
41 § 2972.
46 § 2972 subd. I(a).
47 § 2972 subd. 1(b).
41 § 2972 subd. 2-3.
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CPR and not on physician refusal based on medical futility.4 9 As a
result, the application of the dispute process is arguably limited to
disputes between patients "rejecting cardiopulmonary resuscitation and
an attending physician or the hospital that is caring for the patient"
opposing the request.
The law does not expressly provide a process
for handling the flip side of these disputes when the physician seeks to
withhold CPR based on medical futility and the patient or proxy
objects.
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF DNR LAWS: THE
ETHICAL ISSUES AND THE LAW WHEN A PHYSICIAN
SEEKS TO ISSUE A DNR ORDER OVER PATIENT OR
SURROGATE OBJECTION BASED ON MEDICAL FUTILITY
New York's DNR law, which promotes patient autonomy and surrogate
decision making where it exists as the final word on decisions to
withhold CPR, has been both praised and criticized by medical
ethicists. It has been touted for providing patients with a means for
making their wishes known and for allowing family members and
others who best knew the patient to make decisions for the patient in
accordance with the patient's intent or best interests. It also served to
end unwritten physician practices to withhold CPR without informing
patients. 5 1
Criticism has come from both ends of the ethical
spectrum, however. There are those who are dismayed that it provides
physicians with unilateral authority to issue a DNR without inquiring
about the patient's likely wishes about treatment. 52 Others have argued
that it hamstrings physicians when patients or surrogates refuse to
consent to the entry of a DNR Order when CPR would be medically
futile5 3

§ 2972 subd. 4.
50 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2972 subd. 4.
49

51 See Smith, supra note 5, at 180-184; Do NOT RESUSCITATE ORDERS: THE PROPOSED
LEGISLATION AND REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE Law

6-7

(New York: New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, 2nd ed. 1988).
52 See, e.g., Shaver, supra note 5 (argues that New York's DNR law violates patient's

right of self-determination because it allows doctors to make decisions to issue a DNR for
incompetent patients based on medical futility without knowing or attempting to know the
likely wishes (substituted judgment) of the patient).

53See, e.g., Finucane, supra note 16, at 189 (argues that physicians should have authority
to issue a DNR based on medical futility even if the patient objects).
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Ethical Debate When Patient Autonomy and Medical Futility
Collide
The earlier view, embraced by the courts in the 1970s and 1980s, based
decisions to withhold or withdraw various forms of life-sustaining
treatment, including CPR, on patient autonomy. Originally grounded
in the common law right of competent patients to refuse medical
treatment, the United States Supreme Court determined in 1990 in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health that the right to
refuse lifesaving treatment was a constitutionally protected liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution.54 If the patient's actual or likely wishes were unknown
and could not be determined, courts have consistently found that lifesustaining treatment cannot be discontinued.55 Moreover, under the
patient autonomy model, courts have consistently upheld the right of

patients or proxies to refuse to consent to the termination of medical
56
treatments which, if not provided, would lead to the patient's death.
More recently, a competing ethical theory has been advanced that
proposes that decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment be based on medical futility even over the objection of the
patient or surrogate. 57 This theory seeks to give equal weight to the
medical ethical principles of beneficence and non-maleficence, which,
along with autonomy, form the ethical basis of modem medical
decision making.5 8 Because it is not based on autonomy, its application
14

Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).

55See MEISEL, supra note 17, § 7.12, at 397.
56 See

In re Conservatorship of Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Hennepin Co.

July, 1991); Wendland v. Spark, 574 N.W.2d 327 (Iowa 1998); Causey v. St. Francis Med.
Cntr., 719 So. 2d 1072 (La. Ct. App. 2 Cir. 1998).
57 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5 (argues that New York's DNR law is flawed because it
presumes consent to CPR by patients who have not made an intention known about CPR);
James F. Drane and John L. Coulehan, The Concept ofFutility: Patients Do Not Have the Right
to Demand Medically Useless Treatment, 74 HEALTH PROGRESS 28, 30 (1993) (argues that
patients do not have a right to "futile treatments," defined as "fruitless because they do not
achieve 'worth' in the sense of meeting a patient's medical goal or providing a true personal
benefit...A futile treatment is not ineffective, bu it is worthless, either because the medical
action itself is futile (no matter what the patient's condition) or the condition of the patient
makes it futile."). This article also argues that patient consent is not necessary for a DNR order
when CPR is "deemed futile," referring to the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs.
5' See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5, 186, 187 (a physician's refusal based on medical futility
to issue a DNR which is not medically indicated but without consent of patient or surrogate is
based on ethical principle of beneficence that will usually "trump autonomy.") (further argues
that beneficence should "trump autonomy" when a patient makes a request that "does not
comport with sound medical judgment."); Barney Sneiderman, A Do Not Resuscitate Order for
an Infant Against Parental Wishes: A Comment on the Case of Child and Family Services v.
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is not limited to competent or once competent patients who expressed
an intention about medical treatment.
Followed to its logical end, some commentators have argued that
an informed consent from patients or surrogates is not needed before a
physician issues a DNR because
it is not a treatment being
59
physician.
the
by
recommended
Proponents also argue that medical futility should be the primary
basis for overriding objections of patients or surrogates when the
treating physician determines that providing a life-sustaining treatment
This view is embodied in the Uniform
would be medically futile.
Health-Care Decisions Act, which is the basis for advance directive
legislation in several states. 6 1 Specifically, it states that "ahealth-care
provider or institution may decline to comply with an individual
instruction or health-care decision that requires medically ineffective
health care62or health care contrary to generally accepted health-care
standards."
The Continuing Controversy over the Meaning of Medical Futility
and Whether It Should Override an Autonomous Patient Decision
to Withhold or Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment
The line between patient's rights and physician's rights has been clearly
drawn in the context of DNR orders when patient autonomy conflicts
with medical futility. The patient autonomy model for health care
decision making has not ended the use of CPR that the attending
physician believes to be medically futile. Patients or their families,
when suddenly faced with the issue whether to agree to a DNR order,
are often inclined to say that everything should be done even when the
patient is suffering from the end stage of a terminal disease and the
likelihood that CPR will help the patient is near nil. 6 3 On the other side
R.L. and S.L.H., 7

HEALTH

L. J. 205, 211, 223 (1997) (argues further that physician unilateral

decision to issue DNR under same circumstances can be based on either beneficence or do-noharm ethical
principle).
59
id.
60 Id.
61

Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act (1993, National Conference of Commissioners on

State Laws), 2000 Supplement, Table of Jurisdictions Where Act Has Been Adopted, (Lists
California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, and New Mexico).
62 See Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act, § 7(0 (in "Comments" defines "medically
ineffective health care" as "treatment which would not offer the patient any significant
benefit.").
63 See, e.g., Finucane, supra note 16, at 692, n. 6 (argues that very ill patients are more
willing to do whatever it takes to stay alive, and cites to several studies in support).
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are physicians, experienced in the relative lack of success of CPR for
patients suffering from serious underlying pathologies, who balk at
repeated resuscitations of such patients. Many health care providers
argue that there is no 64right to CPR or other life-sustaining treatment
that is medically futile.
An understanding of the debate requires an analysis and
understanding of the meaning of medical futility.
There are
circumstances when there is a near or absolute certainty that CPR will
not be effective, such as when the patient is already undergoing
maximal treatment when the arrest occurs or where CPR has been tried
repeatedly and failed. 65 In those cases, there is near consensus that it is
medically and ethically appropriate for physicians to unilaterally
discontinue CPR.66
There are other instances, however, where some physicians find a
medical treatment to be futile because the likelihood of success is
small, the patient's quality of life is deemed unacceptable or the benefit
to the patient is considered disproportionate to the burdens to the
patient or the resources required. It is in this latter category that the
meaning of medical futility comes into question and there is
disagreement about the ethical basis for unilaterally discontinuing CPR.
This is because there is some possibility of therapeutic benefit from
CPR, where survival is rare but not unprecedented, and the patient or
surrogate has not consented to its withdrawal.68
64See supra pp. 65-66.
65 See Lo, supra note I (refers to these examples as fitting squarely within the meaning
of medical futility); See Sorum, supra, note 6, at 621-622 (refers to the official guidelines of the
American Heart Association, and finds that the patients who have already undergone full

resuscitation for a period of time without success and patients "whose cardiac arrest is the
culmination of a relentlessly deteriorating and terminal condition - for example, a patient in an
intensive care unit who is receiving maximal therapy but whose blood pressure or oxygen level
is nevertheless progressively falling" as fitting within the medically futile category); See also,
New York State Task Force Report, supra note 9, at 6 (defines "medically inappropriate
resuscitation" as "resuscitation which will probably fail or succeed only to the extent that the
patient is repeatedly resuscitated in a short period of time before death.").
66 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2961 subd. 12 (narrowly defines "medical futility"
as meaning that "cardiopulmonary resuscitation will be unsuccessful in restoring cardiac and
respiratory function or that the patient will experience repeated arrest in a short time period

before death occurs.").

61 See Lo, supra note 1, at 74-75.

68 See Lo, supra note 1, at 75-76 (notes that physicians are often mistaken about the

likelihood of success of CPR and, further, that situations where the use of CPR can be reliably
predicted to be futile are rare, citing to studies); See Sorum, supra note 6, at 619-624) (argues
that lack of effectiveness of CPR and cost are not adequate ethical grounds for denying CPR

and that the only valid limitation of its use must be based on patient autonomy).
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Ethicists advocating medical futility as the primary basis for
medical decision making argue that physicians should be entitled to
override the decisions of patients or their surrogates who refuse to
consent to a DNR order when the physician believes that CPR is
medically futile.69 Their argument is that DNR laws are flawed
because they legislate clinical ethics, putting the law out-of-step with
evolving medical ethics practices. They base their argument on the
concept that a patient's negative right to refuse treatment is larger than
and not synonymous with a positive right to demand treatment not
recommended by the patient's physician.70
Under this line of
reasoning, the physician has no duty to provide a life-sustaining
treatment that the physician does not recommend even if the patient or
surrogate demands the treatment. 71
Others have argued even further that a physician is under no
obligation to discuss a treatment that is not recommended.72
Accordingly, there is no need to obtain consent from the patient or right
to refuse it. As a result, physicians would be empowered to override
autonomous decisions by patients and surrogates to refuse to consent to
a DNR when the physician believes that it would be medically futile to
provide CPR. 73 Further, if physicians have no legal obligation to even
discuss with the patient the treatment they deem to have no benefit, it
stands to reason that patients will be less likely to demand it or to
object if it is not provided.
Aligned against this view are physicians and ethicists who
subscribe to a limited definition of medical futility. As declared in at
least one authoritative medical textbook on clinical decision making,
physicians are justified in unilaterally withholding or withdrawing a
lifesaving treatment if it has no physiologic rationale, if cardiac arrest
continues to occur despite maximal treatment or if the intervention has
already been tried and failed with the patient. 74 Any more expansive
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5.
70 See, e.g., Sneiderman, supra note 58 (citing W. PRIP and A. MORETTI,
69

Medical

Futility: A Legal Perspective, in M.B. ZUCKER & H.D. ZUCKER (eds.), MEDICAL FUTILITY AND
THE EVALUATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 136,

139 ("The difference between the demands "don't touch me" and "you must touch me" is
dramatic. The law has almost uniformly conceded the former but only hesitantly recognized
the latter, and only in situations related to public health and safety.").
71 See MEISEL, supra note 17, §9.5 at 547.
72 See

MEISEL, supra note 17, § 9.5, at 547-48; Lo, supra note 35, at 77.
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5, at 201 (argues that physicians should have the unilateral
authority to issue a DNR for incompetent or terminally ill patients).
73

74

LO, supra note 1, at 73-74.'
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definition of medical futility, based on low likelihood of success,
patient's quality of life or measurement of benefit against resources
required, is a value judgment, not a medical decision, and is not the
physician's decision to make.75 The definition of medical futility
contained in New York's DNR law is narrowly drawn along these
lines.76
Put differently by another commentator, a "provider cannot
unilaterally terminate life support for a deteriorated, but preservable
patient. '77 The surrogate's refusal to consent to a termination of
treatment must be "abusive," where "...the patient is subjected to
pointless suffering" or "... the surrogate's course is inexplicably
78
aberrant from what the vast majority of people would want.
The Legal Debate When Medical Futility and Patient Autonomy
Collide: Courts Have Not Supported Physician-Initiated
Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment over Patient Objection
When the Patient Has Any Chance of Survival
When the withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment will not
result in the death of the patient, physicians have historically had the
ethical and legal right to refuse to treat based on medical futility or for
other reasons. 79 However, a broad physician's right to refuse to treat
has not been recognized in the end-of-life context. 80 Courts have
required that decisions to terminate life-sustaining treatment for once
competent patients be based on autonomy, as expressed prospectively
in an advance directive or other writing executed by the patient when
competent. However, where the patient or surrogate objects, courts
have tacitly aligned with ethicists advocating a limited meaning for
75LO, supra note 35, at 74-75.
76See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2961 subd. 12 (defines "medically futile" to mean that
"cardiopulmonary resuscitation will be unsuccessful in restoring cardiac and respiratory

function or that the patient will experience repeated arrest in a short period of time).

77Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudence
of Death and Dying, 29 J. OF LAW, MED. AND ETHICS 182, 185 (2001).
78
Id. at 186.

79See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (United States Supreme Court refused
to find patient constitutional right to compel physician to assist in patient's suicide); Lo, supra
note 1,at 72 ("Physicians do not need to provide futile interventions, even if patients or
surrogates request them."); id.
at 197 ("Physicians may refuse to care for persons because they
believe the threat to their personal safety or economic security is unacceptable. In other
situations, physicians may seek to terminate a counterproductive or adversarial doctor-patient
relationship.").
80 id.
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medical futility. In other words, if there is any chance that the
treatment will keep the patient alive, it is likely that a court will order
that treatment be continued.81
Courts have provided little support for physicians who seek to
override the objection of a patient or proxy to termination of lifesustaining treatment. Outside of the context of cases involving infants
who were abused or neglected by their parents and near death, courts
have not been receptive to the argument that physicians can override a
surrogate's refusal to consent to the termination 82
of treatment which, if
patient.
the
of
death
the
to
lead
will
,not provided,
In the vast majority of such cases in which there is no question
about the surrogate's good intentions, however, courts have come close
to declaring that CPR or other life-sustaining treatments cannot be
withdrawn when there is an objection. Numerous articles have warned
physicians of the serious legal risk in unilaterally writing a DNR order
83
without informing or obtaining consent from the patient or surrogate.
One commentator has argued that medical futility can only be the basis
for physician decision making when the surrogate's refusal to consent is
abusive. 84
One well known court decision is the Wanglie case, decided by a
Minnesota court in 1991.85 In Wanglie, the 86 years old patient was
sustained by a mechanical respirator, and had been determined by her
physicians to be in a permanent vegetative state. 86 The patient's family
refused to consent to removal of the respirator. The court refused the
application of one of the patient's physicians to be appointed the
patient's guardian in order to terminate life support, finding that the
patient's husband was satisfactorily performing as the patient's
guardian.
In another well-known case, In re Baby K, a hospital treating a
newborn anencephalic patient sought to remove a ventilator which was
"' See, e.g., Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 321, 332 (Iowa 1998) (In wrongful death

action based on physicians unilateral determination to issue DNR without obtaining family
member consent, Court refused to dismiss lawsuit -- "In the present case, in which the chances
of successful resuscitation were questionable and any recovery for wrongful death would be

severely limited because of the patient's preexisting condition, even a small chance of survival
is worth something.").
82 See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 77, at 186.

83See MEISEL, supra note 17 at §9.6 at 554.

84 Cantor, supra note 77, at 188.
85 In re Conservatorship of Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Hennepin Co. July,
1991) (this case is discussed in Sneiderman, supra note 58, at 217-21 8 ).
86 id.
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necessary for the infant's continued survival. 87 Anencephaly crdinarily
results in a newborn's death within days or weeks of birth because of
resulting complications. The mother of the infant opposed the
withdrawal, and the court agreed. Rejecting the argument made by the
hospital that the ventilator was futile because it did not treat the
patient's underlying anencephaly, a terminal condition, the court found
that the treatment was not futile because it resolved the patient's
respiratory distress. Further, the court found that the hospital's failure
or refusal to provide a life-sustaining ventilator for the patient, without
family or surrogate consent to its termination, constituted a violation of
a federal statute, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (EMTALA), which requires that 88
patents with emergency
treatment.
stabilizing
provided
conditions be
On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit in Bryan v. Rectors rejected
an affirmative use of the EMTALA statute by a plaintiff seeking to find
a physician civilly liable for issuing a DNR Order over the patient's
wishes. 89 This can be explained, if not justified, by the tendency of
courts to resist placing civil or criminal liability on physicians who act
upon reasonable medical judgment and
withhold or withdraw life90
sustaining treatment in particular cases.
There is a risk that civil litigation could be commenced when a
physician takes unilateral action over the objection of a patient's family.
Although a physician would appear to be well insulated in withholding
CPR when there is no likelihood that the treatment will be effective,
courts have not been as charitable when there is any possibility that
CPR could have revived the patient. 91 Regardless of the likelihood of
8' In re Baby "K", 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994); cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994); In re
Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992). The Baby "K" case is discussed in Sneiderman, supra note 58,
at 218.

89 Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 95 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 1996).
90See, e.g, Sneiderman, supra note 58, at 220; Barber and Nejdl v. Superior Court, 195
Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) (criminal charges dropped against physician who, with support of family,
discontinued artificial life support. "A physician has no duty to continue treatment once it has
proved to be ineffective. Although there may be a duty to provide life-sustaining machinery in
the immediate aftermath of a cardio-respiratory arrest, there is no duty to continue its use once
it has become futile in the opinion of qualified medical personnel. A physician is authorized
under the standards of medical practice to discontinue a form. of therapy which in his medical

judgment is useless ... without fear of civil or criminal liability. By useless is meant that the
continued use of the therapy cannot and does not improve the prognosis for recovery" id. at
491-92).
9' See, e.g., Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 321, 327 (Iowa 1998); Causey v. St.
Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So.2d 1072 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1998).
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the patient's quality of life after being revived, some Courts have found
that patients are entitled to that chance. 92 In any situation where the
withholding of CPR is contemplated over patient or family objection,
even where the physician deems it physiologically futile, preemptive
application for a court order would immunize the physician from
liability.
NEW YORK'S DNR LAW: DOES IT SUPPORT AN
INTERPRETATION THAT PHYSICIANS CAN TERMINATE
CPR OVER PATIENT OR SURROGATE OBJECTION? IF IT'S
LEGAL, IS IT ETHICAL?
As with other life-sustaining treatment, there is little doubt that laws in
other states require consent from the patient or surrogate before CPR
can be withheld or withdrawn. 93 Further, institutional mandate and
customary hospital practice has been to resuscitate patients when the
patient or surrogate is unable or refuses to consent. 94 CPR has
historically been determined to be an emergency procedure that must
be provided unless the patient has expressed an intent to reject it. It is
only when the patient is incapacitated, the physician has no knowledge
of the patient's wishes about treatment and there is no family member
surrogate available, that some DNR laws, such as New York's law,
have delegated to doctors the right to make such decisions based on
medical futility. New York's DNR law is progressive and changes the
common law which would otherwise prohibit95 the cessation of CPR for
patients where no consent could be obtained.
New York's Department of Health (DOH) has embraced a
seemingly broader interpretation of New York's DNR law, which
would empower physicians to override patient or surrogate refusal to
92 id

93 See, e.g., Sorum, supra note 6 at 633 ("CPR is, like other emergency life-saving
treatments, a procedure to which the patient is automatically presumed to consent in the
absence of an explicit prior decision to withhold it. This principle ... in New York State is
given legal force in the 1988 DNR legislation, follows from the preciousness of life, the
incapacity of the unconscious patient who has suffered the arrest, and the need to start CPR
immediately if it is to have any chance of success.").
94 See, e.g., Finucane, supra note 16, at 699 ("In most facilities in the United States, the

rule is that CPR must be initiated unless a clear order to the contrary has been written."); See,
e.g., Smith, supra note 5, at 184 ("When there are no orders written which specify what
resuscitative measures should be taken with particular patients, hospital policies may well
dictate that a full code should be called for, in other words, resuscitation is initiated.").
95 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5, at 195.
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consent and unilaterally enter a DNR order. A pamphlet containing
answers to common questions by health care providers about New
York's DNR law, prepared by the Department of Health, the New York
State Task Force on Life and the Law, and other health care groups, has
been placed on the official Department of Health website. 96 The New
York State Task Force on Life and the Law, comprised of noted
physicians, medical ethicists and other professionals, was an early
seminal influence on evolving medical ethical issues. Among other
credits, the Task Force drafted New York's DNR law.
The following question and answer is posed on the Department of
Health website:
"Q[uestion]: What if the health care agent or surrogate
refuses to consent to a DNR order and the physician
believes that CPR would be futile for the patient?
[Answer]: The attending physician must seek a second
opinion. If the second physician concurs that CPR would
be futile, as futility is defined by the law, and the
concurrence is written in the chart, the attending physician
may enter the order
on grounds of futility, but must
7
inform the agent.0
This information is well known to New York physicians, who likely
rely upon it when making decisions to issue DNR orders over the
refusal of patients or their families.
Courts in New York, as in other jurisdictions, perform a
deferential review of governmental agency decisions, which presumes
the agency's competence in its field of expertise. Under this limited
review, a court will only overturn an agency interpretation if it is
arbitrary and capricious. 98 In other words, the court will not disturb an
96 Do NOT RESUSCITATE ORDERS - QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR HEALTH CARE

PROFESSIONALS (New York: New York State Task Force on Life and Law, Medical Society of
the State of New York, and Hospital Association of New York State, 2nd ed. 1992), at 28; can
be found at www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/consumer/patient/dnrmain.htm (last visited Dec. 20,
2002).
97id.
98 See, e.g., Marzec v. DeBuono, 95 N.Y.2d 262, 266 (2000); Matter of Howard v.
Wyman, 28 N.Y.2d 434, 438 (1971); Matter of N.Y. Health Plan Ass'n, Inc. v. Levin, 723

N.Y.S2d 819 (2001) (state insurance department "circular letter" interpreting state's Prompt
Payment Law as holding HMOs and health insurers liable for late payment even if have
contractually delegated claims payment process found not to be arbitrary and capricious);
Matter of Taher v. Novello, 718 N.Y.S.2d 520 (2000) (department's interpretation of its
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agency's interpretation if it has a rational basis. 99 An absence of agency
authority to decide an issue can be the basis for a court reversal of an
agency decision.10°
Further, the court will not defer to an agency
guideline that "runs counter to the clear wording of a statutory
10
provision."
The position taken by the DOH is novel because it weighs a
physician's right to withhold a life-sustaining treatment over an
autonomous objection by a patient or surrogate. It is supported by a
broad ethical consensus because the DOH begins with the premise that
the two-physician authority to override based on medical futility
requires that "CPR would be futile, as futility is defined by the law."
(emphasis added) °2 New York's DNR statute narrowly defines
"medically futile" to mean that "cardiopulmonary resuscitation will be
unsuccessful in restoring cardiac and respiratory function or that the
10 3
patient will experience repeated arrest in a short period of time."
This meaning goes little beyond physiologic futility, in which CPR by
definition would have no chance of keeping the patient alive after CPR
was completed, and is accepted across the ethical spectrum as an
appropriate basis for withholding CPR. When medical futility is
defined narrowly, virtually all medical ethicists agree that beneficence
and non-maleficence, other guiding principles in medicine, supercede
patient autonomy. 104
regulations denying request that cost of equipment include in skilled nursing facility's
reimbursement rate was not irrational, unreasonable, or contrary to state law).
99Matter of Crater Club v. Adirondack Park Agency, 86 A.D.2d 714, aff'd 57 N.Y.2d
990; Sigety v. Ingraham, 29 N.Y.2d 110 (1971); Cortlandt Nursing Care Center v. Whalen, 46
N.Y.2d 979 (1979).
0 See, e.g., N.Y. State Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Novello, 734 N.Y.S2d 420 (2001)
(Court found that Department of Health lacked the statutory authority to issue standards for
physician use of certified registered nurse anesthetists rather than anesthesiologist physicians in
office-based surgeries).
101Matter of N.Y. Public Interest Group, Inc., v. Dept. of Insurance, 66 N.Y.2d 444, 448
(1985); See also Kurcsics v. Merchants Mutual Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 451, 459 (1980) ("if the
regulation runs counter to the clear wording of a statutory provision, it should not be entitled to
any weight.").
102 See QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS,
supra note 96, at
28.
103N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2961 subd. 12.
104See,

e.g., Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights

and Obligations In The Physician-PatientRelationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 47
(1993) ("For centuries, physician beneficence went unchallenged as the first principle of
medical ethics.... [N]o creditable ethical opposition was mounted until a quarter of a century
ago when patient autonomy was asserted as a prima facie moral principle of equal or greater
weight than beneficence.").
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If the DOH's interpretation is clearly within ethical norms, is it
legal? New York's DNR law provides no explicit authority for
physicians to withhold CPR under any circumstances when the patient
or surrogate refuses consent. The law in New York and other states
clearly treats CPR as an emergency procedure that must be provided if
it stands some chance of keeping the patient alive. Although a
physician will likely be able to avoid criminal liability if CPR is
withheld for a terminally ill or permanently unconscious patient, the
physician could face a malpractice lawsuit. Consent is not required to
perform CPR or provide other emergency treatment, but New York's
DNR law at first glance would appear to require that the patient or
surrogate agree if it is not to be provided.
However, a statute does not stand alone and should be interpreted
against a backdrop of public policy and normative values. In the case
of New York's DNR law, it would follow, based on established
principles of jurisprudence, that the legislature did not intend to provide
patients with unfettered authority to demand CPR even when the
attending physician has determined that it would provide no therapeutic
value to the patient and that with certainty CPR would not keep the
patient alive after the treatment was completed. In the context of the
provision of non-lifesaving treatment, patients do not have the authority
to demand medical treatment that the treating physician believes holds
no therapeutic value. Likewise, it would be nonsensical, in the absence
of explicit instruction in the law to the contrary, to believe that the
legislature intended by its enactment of New York's DNR law to create
a patient right to demand CPR that provided no physiologic value to the
patient. Indeed, a prime purpose of the law was to end physician and
hospital slow and show codes by providing a means for patients to
prospectively exercise autonomy to consent to a DNR order, the theory
being that patients or surrogates would consent to a DNR order when
CPR was medically futile. To allow patients or surrogates absolute
authority to demand CPR, including medically futile CPR, would result
in more clashes with physicians and more DNR issues than before the
law's enactment. Unfortunately, the law did not envision that patients
or their families might demand CPR that under any definition was
medically futile.
Further, the DOH's view is supported by court cases in which
medical futility issues have been raised. Courts have measured the use
or withholding of life-sustaining treatment on whether the treatment, if
provided, would keep the patient alive. Courts have rejected expansive
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definitions of medical futility based on low likelihood of success,
patient's quality of life or an allocation of limited resources analysis.
Further, courts have clearly aligned with the narrow definition of
medical futility espoused by some ethicists and by the DOH, in which
there cannot be even a small chance of survival, including a
compromised survival, in order for the treatment to be deemed
medically futile.
It is submitted that a patient right to demand CPR that provides no
chance of continued life, or that goes against ethical consensus and
legal precedent on the meaning of medical futility, cannot be read into
New York's DNR law.
Accordingly, the DOH's position that
physicians can act unilaterally to withhold CPR that will provide no
benefit to the patient is on firm legal and ethical footing. It would
likely withstand challenge under the deferential standard applied by
New York courts when reviewing governmental agency decisions. A
medical malpractice suit would likely
also be unsuccessful under this
10 5
futility.
medical
of
narrow definition
At the same time, the DOH does not authorize physicians to make
unilateral medical futility determinations that are based on low
likelihood of success, patient quality of life, or other reasons that are in
effect value judgments and not medical decisions. Further, the DOH
interpretation protects patients by requiring that all decisions related to
CPR, whether to provide CPR or to unilaterally issue a DNR order, be
discussed with the patient or surrogate. 10 6 This comports with legal
analysis on informed consent and the ethical position that is most
protective of patient autonomy, which holds that patients must be
informed of all decisions related to their medical care, including
decisions to not provide a life-sustaining treatment.
Arguably, the interpretation by the DOH conflicts with the law's
goal to promote patient self-determination and family decision making.
However, it also promotes what appears to be the primary, unstated
goal of the law: to limit the use of CPR to those cases in which the
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The position taken by New York's Department of Health could
herald a recognition of the limits of health care decision making based
on the principle of autonomy alone and revitalize other medical ethical
principles, primarily beneficence and non-maleficence. The theory, if
not the practice of medicine, in the past several decades has been to
promote autonomy. 18 However, autonomy has never stood alone: the
law has balanced autonomy against state interests. Further, in medical

ethics, autonomy is a relative latecomer. Historically, beneficence was
the key guiding principle in medicine, existing for as long as the
Hippocratic Oath and well before autonomy. 1° 9 Providing physicians
with authority to issue DNR orders when CPR provides no benefit to
a balance
the patient, even over patient objection, is an attempt to strike
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Moreover, the Do-No-Harm principle is a well known provision of
the Hippocratic Oath. It is reinvigorated under the interpretation
embraced by Department of Health because it provides support for
physicians who object to providing an ineffective treatment that causes
the patient suffering.
Recognition of the importance of the principles of beneficence and
non-maleficence can be found in the terms "medical futility" and
"treatment." These terms, carefully defined, form the ethical basis for
physician decisions to withhold medical treatment that could prolong
the patient's life. If there is a near certainty that CPR will not revive
the patient, such as when it has been tried and failed or cardiac arrest
occurs while the patient is receiving maximal treatment, then it would
be ethically appropriate to issue a DNR. The key is whether CPR will
return the patient from cardiac or respiratory distress, not whether the
patient will or may lose brain functioning or already exist in a low
quality state. To make such a decision based on a likelihood of a
successful return to a "quality life" is to make a value judgment, which
107 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTii LAW § 2960 (purpose of law was "to clarify and

establish the rights and obligations of patients, their families, and health care providers
regarding cardiopulmonary resuscitation and the issuance of orders not to resuscitate.").
'08 See, e.g., Sorum, supra note 6, at 629.
109 See, e.g., Pellegrino, supra note 104, at 47.

"0 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5, at 187 (in the context of patient requests for a partial
DNR code, states that "[s]imply because a competent patient makes a request of this nature,
does not mean it must be respected; if it does not comport with sound medical judgment by a
health care provider, it will not be executed. Beneficence will usually trump autonomy.").
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is beyond the limited meaning of medical futility and beyond the
physician's competence, as compared to that of the patient, to make
medical decisions.
A further basis for recognition of beneficence and nonmaleficence, which may provide a basis for trumping patient autonomy,
may be found in the meaning of treatment - it is axiomatic that an
intervention which will not provide a benefit to the patient and in fact
may harm the patient is not a treatment and, accordingly, could be the
basis for unilaterally issuing a DNR order. Again, determining benefit
must be assessed strictly on whether the treatment will resolve the
patient's breathing or cardiac crisis, not on its effect on the patient's
underlying pathology. 11
CONCLUSION
Once again, New York's DNR law is on the leading edge of medical
ethics. This time it is on the forefront of the medical futility debate and
whether a physician's determination that a lifesaving treatment holds no
therapeutic value, based on medical ethical principles of beneficence
and Do No Harm, overrides patient autonomy. Although the legal and
ethical debate has been framed as a battle of competing medical
principles and as an attack on patient autonomy, ultimately it comes
down to how we choose to define medical futility and treatment.
Ethically, there is consensus that there are times when CPR does
not provide a benefit or would be harmful to the patient because it
would be disproportionately painful to the patient as compared to the
benefit. 112 If the patient's underlying condition is such that with
physiologic certainty CPR will not keep the patient alive (e.g. that even
with CPR effective circulation cannot be sustained or the type of CPR
intervention has already been tried and failed), by any ethical meaning
this would constitute a medically futile treatment. Under these
circumstances, a physician's decision to issue a DNR order over the
objection of the patient or surrogate is ethically moored, provided the
physician discusses the DNR order with the patient, agent, or surrogate.
Finding ethical consensus on the medical futility of CPR or other
life-sustaining treatment, however, requires that medical futility be
defined narrowly to the question whether it will resolve the patient's
1
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cardiac or respiratory distress. If it can be said to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty that CPR will not, physicians ethically can, with
disclosure to the patient or proxy, unilaterally issue a DNR order.
The interpretation advanced by the New York State Department of
Health of New York's DNR law, which is aligned with this more
restrictive definition of medical futility and which requires disclosure to
the patient or surrogate, meets ethical standards under any view. It can
and should be read into New York's DNR law that physicians, with
patient disclosure, can unilaterally issue a DNR under this limited
definition of medical futility.
Many physicians and ethicists, however, advocate a broader
definition of futility based on whether CPR will resolve the patient's
underlying pathology or whether resuscitation will result in an
unacceptably low quality of life. This view has been criticized because
it effectively imbues physicians with authority to make decisions about
whether the patient's life is worth saving, and goes beyond the
competence of physicians to make medical decisions. These are value
judgments that belong to patients and their families.
Alternatively, the argument that the likelihood of success is low
must be rejected because of the inability of physicians to accurately
predict the effectiveness of CPR. Where the patient has any chance,
the courts have uniformly found, in support of ethicists who favor a
narrow definition of medical futility, that physicians owe a duty to their
patients to take those actions necessary to save the patient.' 13 It is not
the physician's prerogative to make unilateral decisions to withhold a
life-sustaining intervention because of the physician's determination
that resuscitation would result in a low likelihood of success or that the
patient would likely be revived to a life "not worth living."
The guidelines promulgated by New York's Department of Health,
because they are tied to a legal definition of medical futility embodied
in the DNR statute, do not support a broader, qualitative definition of
medical futility advanced by some ethicists. Further, the DOH rejects
the argument that disclosure need not be made to patients or families of
a physician's determination to withhold CPR.
Sometimes, end-of-life issues come down to the need of families
and patients for more time in order to come to grips with the patient's
dire medical prognosis. It is a matter of human dignity, of providing
patients with the opportunity for a "good death," that physicians should
113See, supra, pp. 70-73.
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only as a last resort, when CPR holds no therapeutic value and only
after fully communicating with the patient or family, unilaterally issue
a DNR order.
Under all circumstances, including situations where CPR can with
certainty be deemed medically futile, fairness and respect for patients
requires that physicians inform patients and their families when they
recommend the issuance of a DNR order. The DOH's position, which
requires that patients and surrogates be informed when a physician
decides that CPR be withheld, is well within these ethical, legal and
moral standards.
Further, New York's DNR law recognizes the value of a coolingoff period before a DNR order is issued and provides for a review
process that includes a non-adversarial forum for resolution of disputes
over CPR. Hospital ethics committees, which contain physicians but
also non-medical professionals and lay people, can adequately fill this
function. It is crucial that ethics committees hearing these issues
include people from outside the health care profession, so that a nonclinical perspective on issues can be considered. For instance, a
layperson committee member may be better able to share the concerns
of the patient's family and to effectively communicate with them.
Ethics committees which contain people from many backgrounds
would also make it possible that decisions will be grounded in societal
normative values.
Should we as a society give doctors the right to override a patient's
request for a treatment that represents a chance to live? And should we
give doctors the right to make qualitative assessments of futility or to
perform bedside rationing of care based on the value of the life left to
be lived? Neither the publication co-authored by the New York State
Department of Health, New York's DNR law, nor court cases, support
these views. There is no morally valid reason why doctors should be
accorded such absolute authority. Arguments that physicians will
withhold CPR anyway and that it is better that this be done openly, or
that financial reasons require that triage decisions based on utilitarian
principles be made about who should receive treatment, are both
ethically and morally troubling.
Decisions based on financial
considerations or bedside rationing are value judgments, and are
beyond the competence of physicians to make. Patients and their
families should retain the right to make determinations about CPR
where there is hope, however small, that the patient's life can be
continued, however compromised.
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Giving physicians broad authority to unilaterally issue DNR
orders hearkens back to the days of paternalistic beneficence, which
was rejected by the past century's emphasis on patient autonomy.
However, the position advanced by New York's Department of Health,
which is based on the New York DNR law's restrictive definition of
medical futility which requires a determination that CPR holds no value
to sustaining the patient's life before it can be withheld, regardless of
the patient's underlying pathology or the likelihood that the patient will
have a poor quality of life if resuscitated, strikes a balance between
autonomy and beneficence that is supported by the vast majority of
jurists and ethicists.
The debate over New York's DNR law could herald a valid
recognition of the limits of health care decision making based on the
principle of autonomy alone, and revitalize medical ethical principles
of beneficence and non-maleficence which have historically guided
patient autonomy before the advent of patient autonomy in the last
century. It could also provide guidance to other states similarly seeking
to balance the interests of patients and health care providers when these
other medical ethical principles are at odds with patient autonomy and
when the use of a life-sustaining treatment is at issue.
Clearly, decisions related to withholding CPR must always be
handled with care and dignity. To die because your doctor refuses to
provide a treatment as basic as CPR, without seeking patient consent or
over patient objection, is not a dignified death. We as a society can
afford and ought to give our citizens the right to be informed about
physician decisions to treat or not treat, and to be provided lifesustaining treatment that offers a chance, however minimal, of
continued life. Further, even in cases in which CPR by any definition
is medically futile, patients and their families should be provided a
review forum that includes lay people as well as medical professionals
in order to have their say and make their peace.

